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Learning from Risk: Organizational Interaction
following the Armenian Earthquakes
by
Louise K. Comfort and the Disaster Reanimatology study Group
Designing Policy for Environments of Seismic Risk
Catastrophic earthquakes pose one of the most difficult
tests of policy design and implementation for public organiza-
tions. Policy makers are confronted with at least five condi-
tions that challenge their capacity to assess th~ risk accurately
and to design appropriate alternatives for response, should an
event occur. First, there is the sharp contrast in the concept
of time between the brief institutional memory of modern pUblic
organizations and the long span of years between geological
events. Major earthquakes occu~, within ranges of 90 - 150 years
in zones of known seismic risk. 1 Governmental agencies, operat-
ing on year-to-year bUdgets, often discount the risk of events
that occur with such infrequency. Lessons learned from past
events are easily forgotten, as decades pass without recurrence.
The trauma generated when earthquakes do occur reflects, in part,
the decision not to act in preference to other needs, perceived
as more immediate.
Second, it is the'interaction between earthquakes and human
settlements that generate disaster (Turner, 1978; Shrivastava,
1987). As populations move increasingly into seismic zones, with
accompanying infrastructure and unplanned patterns of settlement,
1 David Boutacoff, "Real World Lesson's in Seismic Safety"
in EPRI Journal, June 1989: 23-29.
1
the risk to human life and property increases. Paradoxically,
populations in seismic environments, unaware of the risk and
consequences of earthquakes, may escalate that risk with inap-
propriate construction, uninformed actions or inadequate coping
skills.
Third, designing policy for preparedness and response to
earthquakes is necessarily an interdisciplinary and interor-
ganizational task (Comfort, 1985, 1986, 1989a, 1989b). No single
discipline, no given organization commands all of the information
or resources needed for appropriate preparedness or response.
The effective delivery of medical services to assist injured
victims, for example, depends upon timeliness of extrication,
availability of appropriate life-saving first aid, 'access to
needed extrication and medical equipment, adequacy of transporta-
tion, functioning communications, water and power facilities
(Klain et al., 1989.) It is the rapid integration of muitiple
skills, services and organizations into a coherent response
process that facilitates the protection of life and property in a
disaster. Yet, in routine operations, the personnel and organ-
izations required for such a response are unlikely to work
together. Effective response to disaster requires individuals
and organizations to shift to a higher level of abstraction in
understanding their roles in relation to the overall goal of
humanitarian assistance and in coordinating their actions with
others in an integrated community effort. Such shifts are
difficult to accomplish without preparedness and practice, which,
2
in turn, are unlikely without awareness of the risk -- Catch 22.
Fourth, disaster response is necessarily interjurisdiction-
al. In a catastrophic earthquake, the capacity of the local
jurisdiction to respond to the needs of its population is, by
definition, overwhelmed. 2 Appropriate response, therefore,
involves multiple levels of government, local, regional, national
and international. The problems of communication and coordina-
tion within and between jurisdictions escalate with the scope of
the disaster and the levels of jurisdictional participation.
Fifth, managing the information involved in preparedness and
response for such complex, uncertain, dynamic events rapidly
overloads human and organizational information processing
capacity (Simon, 1969, 1981). The coordination of multiple
individuals and organizati~ns in effective disaster response
actions depends upon timely, accurate accessible information. In
disaster operations, response personnel are working both in real
time and against time (Zancanato, 1988) in their efforts to save
lives and protect property. Accurate, accessible information is
integral to the capacity to mobilize action under the urgent
constraints of time and distance in appropriate disaster re-
sponse. Information serves as the "nerves" of governmental
operation, to recall that memorable image of Karl Deutsch. (1963,
1966) . This role for information is underscored in the complex,
2. U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 1980. An
Assessment of the Consequences and Preparations for g Catas-
trophic California Earthquake: Findings and Actions Taken.
Washington, D.C.
3
dynamic environment of risk and disaster management.
Given these five conditions, the task of designing policy
for environments of seismic risk creates an extraordinary
challenge for human reasoning capacity. The set of conditions
exceeds the boundaries of manipulative reason or even wisdom.
Remaining is the category of "perceptive reason" or openness to
new ideas, insights and learning from external sources (Deutsch,
1963 , 19 66 : xv). How to create such a learning environment is,
•
inherently, a problem of design.
The Operational Context of Disaster
The Armenian earthquakes of December 7, 1988 vividly
illustrate these challenges to policy design and implementation.
The first earthquake occurred, without warning, at 11:41 a.m. on
that sunny Wednesday morning. Measuring 6.9 on the Richter scale
with an epicenter neaF" Spitak, the earthquake had devastating
effects on four cities in northern Armenia -- Spitak, Leninakan,
Kirovakan, Stepanavan and 58 villages in the area. Four
minutes later, an aftershock of magnitude 5.8 on the Richter
scale damaged further buildings already weakened in the first
temblor. In minutes, buildings had collapsed, water,' electricity
and communications were destroyed, tens of thousands of people
were killed and injured, and hundreds of thousands were rendered
homeless. Nearly one-third of Armenia's population of 3.5
million were affected to some degree by the earthquakes. Public
organizations, unprepared for such devastation, struggled to
devise appropriate responses to the immensity of human needs
4
generated by the seismic events.
was an understatement.
Catastrophe, in this context,
Three conditions make the Armenian earthquakes distinctive
in terms of demands for publ ic pol icy response. First, the
earthquakes were extraordinary in the scope of damage and de-
struction generated for the human settlements in the area. Table
1 cites data reported by the civil Defense, Armenia SSR regarding
the consequences of the earthquakes upon population centers,
•
industrial facilities, cultural buildings, residences, agricul-
tural facilities and livestock of the affected area. Table 2
shows the steep decline in live extrications of victims from the
rubble after Day 4, dropping still further by Day 5 to virtually
none after Day 12. These data provide grim evidence of the
struggle against time in life-saving efforts.
Table 3 reports the type and day of receipt of equipment for
rescue work, increasing in number with time for mobilization but
decreasing in utility for life-saving operations. Table 4 shows
the number and types of personnel and equipment utilized in
rescue operations by location. civil defense units, with legal
responsibility for response in disaster operations, were avail-
able only for the two major population areas affected -- Lenina-
kan and Spitak. The other areas were left with only civilian
personnel to carry out rescue operations. Table 5 shows the
response to the earthquake consequences by area. Particularly
telling is the finding that in the rural areas, left largely
without trained personnel for rescue operations, 98% of the
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victims extricated from the rubble were dead. The reported cost
of the disaster totaled $16 billion.
Second, the earthquakes generated an equally extraordinary
response in terms of disaster assistance to the victims. within
Armenia, there was an immensely strong empathy and identification
with victims and their families.
affected in some way by the disaster
Almost every Armenian was
either by enduring the
loss of family, friends, or colleagues or by being involved in
•
some significant way with relief activities. Within the USSR,
the Armenian earthquakes represented an historic instance in
which the Central Government publicly accepted responsibility for
a local disaster. News of the disaster was carried on national
television. National political figures visited the devastated
area. Students J physicians, rescue workers carne from Karabakh,
Kiev, Moscow, Leningrad and other parts of the country to assist
their stricken countrymen. 3
Within the Armenian Diaspora, the response was equally swift
and generous. Armenian communities in the United States, France,
Germany, Italy, Great Britain and Austria sent money, physicians,
supplies and equipment, strengthening cultural and religious ties
with their homeland. Within the international community, some 50
nations sent aid and solidarity payments. At least 267 physi-
3. The extraordinarily generous response to the needs of the
Armenian population from within the USSR is amply documented in
both the US and Soviet press. See, for example, the New York
Times issues for December 8 31, 1988. These accounts were
verified by reports from our Soviet colleagues during formal and
informal discussions, March 13 - 26, 1989.
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cians from 14 nations volunteered their time and services in
medical care for the victims. 4 Table 5 also cites humanitarian
aid received in Armenia to meet basic needs of food and shelter
for the victims. By December 31, 1988, Armenia had received
$108,818,759 in disaster assistance from the international
community. 5 The events in Armenia had created new networks of
communication, assistance and support, crossing local, regional,
national and international boundaries.
Third, the most distinctive characteristic of the Armenian
earthquakes was the startling deadliness of their effects,
despite the extraordinary efforts made in response. This deadli-
ness is shown by two measures. The usual ratio of injured to
dead, calculated from records of previous seismic events, is
3:1. 6 In the Armenian earthquakes, this ratio was reversed. Ap-
proximately three persons were found dead for every live victim
extricated, as shown by the data reported in Table 5. Addition-
ally, the gravity of injuries reported to hospitals in this
disaster was exceptionally high. Of the 9,976 patients hospital-
ized immediately after the earthquake, 5,012 or 50.2% were
4 Data prov ided by the Ministry of Health, Armenia SSR,
March 24, 1989.
5 Data provided by
Counselor, Embassy of the
USSR, March 16, 1989.
the German Red
Federal Republic
Cross. Interview,
of Germany, Moscow,
6. This ratio has been estimated by the Pan American Health
Organization, based upon cumulative data on the number of
injuries/number of dead reported for recent earthquakes in the
Americas. This ratio is cited in a documentary film, "Interna-
tional Disaster Assistance," prepared by PARa for distribution in
1987.
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classified as being in very grave or grave condition. 7 Many of
these patients had mUltiple" injuries that compounded their
effects to reduce the victim's overall physical state.
The severity of consequences from the Armenian earthquakes
contrasts with the damage reported from earthquakes in other
regions within a comparable range on the Richter scale. For
example, the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake in California register-
ed 6.6· on the Richter scale, but less than 100 victims were
killed. 8 The Mexico City Earthquake of 1985 registered 8.0 on
the Richter scale, with approximately 10,000 known dead. 9 In the
Chilean earthquake of March, 1985, magnitude 7.0 on the Richter
scale, the bulk of injuries reported consisted of simple frac-
tures, cuts and bruises. 10
The extraordinary cost in lives and dollars reported in
these findings compel us to ask why the Armenian earthquakes were
so deadly and to re-examine the performance of the social,
organizational and cultural systems critical to disaster pre-
paredness and essential to the mobilization of disaster response.
The capacity of these systems to recognize and respond appro-
7. These data were reported by Robert A. Charchoghlian and
R. V. Sekoyan in a -paper presented by Dr. Charchoghl ian at a
conference on Earthquake Injury Epidemiology held at Johns
Hopkins University in Baltimore, MD on JUly 10 - 12, 1989.
8. US Geological Survey Reports, San Fernando Earthquake, 1971.
9 U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster
Disaster Report: The Mexico City Earthquake,
January, 1986.
Assistance,
Washington,
Final
D. C. :
10 Pan American Health Organization, Medical Report, The
Chilean Earthquake, March, 1985.
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priately to the known threat of seismic risk, antecedent to the
construction of the physical buildings that failed in Armenia, is
central to our understanding of the problem of designing policy
for environments at risk.
Unresolved Problems in Environments of Seismic Risk: Lessons from
Armenia
Reviewing the set of events and the ensuing consequences of
disaster operations from the Armenian earthquakes, three problems
stand out as integrally related to the failure of human and
physical systems in this environment of seismic risk. These
problems are recognizable in similar environments elsewhere in
the world, and, without appropriate design for public policy, are
likely to recur with the next major earthquake, whenever and
wherever that may be. These problems, recognized by Soviet and
US observers alike, include: 1) the interdependence of events
that lead to disaster, created by the interaction between seismic
events and the physical and social systems established by human
communities in seismic zones; 2) the organization of coordinated
response among mUltiple organizations and jurisdictions with
emergency responsibilities; and 3) the efficiency of response
operations, that is, allocating scarce resources for maximum
benefit to minimize losses for the affected population. Each
problem will be discussed briefly in turn.
, The Problem of Interdependence
The Armenian earthquakes illustrated again the fact that
earthquakes trigger not only the collapse of buildings and the
14
consequent injury and death of victims, but also the collapse of
the infrastructure of communication and coordination that enable
local communities to respond to the demands generated by dis-
aster. This infrastructure includes the systems of communica-
tions, transportation, and organizational capacity to mobilize
resources and personnel. For example, in Spitak, the central
telephone office was totally destroyed in the earthquake, leaving
the town with no civilian telephone communications. In the other
cities of Armenia, the situation was the same. The mil i tary
telephone system was operating, but it was not available to
civilian personnel and could not be used to call civilian
organizations or personnel. 11
This condition was further complicated in the multicultural
context of Armenia, where the language of coordination used by
government agencies, Russian, differs from the language of the
people who need services, Armenian. 12 This complexity increased
with the entry of international search and rescue teams, and
additional languages, into disaster operations. Cultural
differences posed a formidable barrier to cognitive processes in
human interaction, already under stress by the trauma of the
event. 13 Coordination requires an infrastructure of communica-
13
11 Briefing, civil Defense Headquarters, Armenia SSR,
Yerevan, Armenia, March 21, 1989.
12 Briefing, Civil Defense Headquart'ers, Armenia SSR,
Yerevan, Armenia, March 21, 1989.
See the discussion of the selective identification of
risk in Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.) See also the
15
tion and common understanding that facilitates collaborative
problem solving and action (Simon, 1969, 1981).
In the complex, uncertain environment of disaster, failure
in one system triggers failure in other, related systems. Like
dominoes falling in sequence, the earthquakes in Armenia ini-
tiated a series of events that caused systemic failure in the
affected communities. For example, the schools collapsed,
seriously injuring children and teachers trapped inside.
Simultaneously, the communications facilities needed to call for
assistance were destroyed, as were the hospital facilities needed
to provide prompt medical care to the injured victims, had
transport been available to get them there. Tragically, victims
who survived the earthquake died from the damaged community's
inability to respond to their needs in time. 14
The problems in Armenian disaster operations were inherently
interdisciplinary, requiring the combined knowledge and skills
from multiple disciplines to mobilize appropriate response under
the urgent time constraints of disaster. The complexity of
disaster is such that no single discipline can unravel the
problem. Each, in turn, contributes sUbstantively to solving the
problem. Yet, it requires continual adjustment to maintain the
focus of attention on the shared problem of saving lives in order
argument presented by Judith Bradbury, liThe Policy Implications
of Differing Concepts of Culture" in Science, Technology and
Human Values, Vol. 14, no. 4; 1989, in press.
14 Interviews, Lay witnesses, Spitak, Leninakan, Armenia
SSR, March 22, 1989.
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to bring relevant information from the disciplines of geophysics,
engineering, medicine, organization and management to bear on the
succession of dynamically evolving events in disaster operations.
Without focus, efforts to take action may lapse into stalemate or
wander off track in ineffective uses of resources and time.
The Problem of Organization
The problem of organization follows directly from the
interdependence of human systems in communal environments.
Without communication, there can be no coordination. without
coordination, there can be no organization. Both Soviet and
international observers noted an initial lack of organization in
the search and rescue operations. 15 Coordination of action means
knowing what to do, how to do it, when to do it, who will do it
and what to do it with. This knowledge depends upon a shared
understanding of the requirements of action among the parti-
cipants (Simon, 1969, 1981) involved in disaster operations.
Without organization, large numbers of individuals, though
well-intended, may actually slow down the search and rescue
process, or hamper it in other ways. For example, when students
at Yerevan state University learned of the earthquakes in
northern Armenia about 5:00 p.m. on December 7, 1988, they
arranged buses for transportation and left for Leninakan.
However, they had no previous experience in disaster operations
and arriv~d in Leninakan, eager to work but unprepared for the
15. Briefing, Chief of Medicine, USSR civil Defense, Moscow,
March 18, 1989. See also newspaper accounts of response to the
disaster, New York Times, December 8 - 31, 1989.
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extent of devastation they found. They had no tools, no lights,
no tents, no first aid training, no gloves for working outdoors
in sUbfreezing temperatures. For too many, the experience was
fruitless and their energies were expended unproductively.
Disappointed, they returned to Yerevan and tried to regroup.16
To achieve organization in disaster environments requires
clear definition of the classic functions of disaster operations,
so that multiple participants may be integrated into an overall
response effort to meet the vast array of demands generated by
the disaster. This definition of tasks is a product of conscious
policy design, best done prior to the event. Time taken for
organization after the event subtracts precious minutes, hours or
days from the critical period during which life-saving operations
are most-productive. 17
The Problem of Efficiency
Difficulties generated by the interdependence of events and,
sequentially, in the organization of response lead to the problem
of efficiency in disaster operations. In the Armenian disaster,
this problem was underscored by the high expenditure of effort
and money in disaster response in comparison to the low rate of
return in terms of lives saved and the heavy losses reported in
damages. The sobering losses in the Armenian earthquakes--
16. Interview, student participants in disaster operations,
Yerevan state University, Yerevan, Armenia, March 20, 1989.
17. See Table 2 above; see also P. Safar, E. Pretto and N.
Bircher, "Disaster Resuscitology Including Management of Severe
Trauma" in P. Baskett and R. Weller (eds.), Medicine for Dis-
-asters (London: Wright-Butterworth Publ., 1988): 36-86.
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25,000 reported dead and $16 billion in damages -- compel us to
re-examine our understanding of the processes of disaster
management and to reconsider our present procedures for response.
Efficiency in disaster operations requires a different
measure, when the goal is to save lives placed at risk. The data
show that if victims are extricated within the first 72 - 96
hours, their chances of survival are higher. The rate of live
recoveries drops sharply after Day 4 and precipitously after Day
5. The measure of efficiency in disaster operations is neces-
sarily time, not money, which runs counter to the measure used in
routine operations by most government agencies.
The efficiency of the international search and rescue teams
in the Armenian disaster operations illustrates this problem.
The French rescue team, first of the international teams, arrived
79 hours after the event. The team helped 1,000 people who were
injured, but they rescued only 15 live victims from the rubble. 18
other teams arrived still later and rescued still fewer live
victims. 19 Disaster management necessarily involves the period
before the event as well as after in order to address the problem
of efficiency.
Can losses incurred in disaster be reduced? We cannot stop
18 Interview, Attache and Coordinator, French Contribution
to Armenian Disaster Assistance, Embassy of France, Moscow, USSR,
March 17, 1989.
19 Interviews with officials responsible for coordinating
their respective nation's contribution to Armenian disaster
assistance in the Embassies of the United States, Great Britain,
West Germany and Italy, Moscow, USSR, March 15 - 18, 1989.
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the earthquakes, but are there actions that can be taken prior to
such events to reduce the risk to human populations and to lessen
the damage to built environments in zones of known seismicity?
In terms of efficiency, expenditures projected over a lOa-year
period to strengthen construction codes or to prepare populations
to respond to known threats may be calculated against the known
costs of disaster where these actions have not been taken. To
initiate such a policy, however, requires that the respons ible
organizations take the "long term view" (Naisbitt, 1983), a shift
in perspective that does not corne easily in human organizations
vying for immediate support in complex policy environments
(Deutsch, 1963, 1965). Such a policy shift is not likely to be
achieved without design.
Disaster managers are working against time in seeking to
increase the efficiency of response operations (Zancanato, 1988;
Safar, 1976, 1986.) Actions taken or not taken in one phase of
the classic cycle of disaster management may facilitate or hamper
operations in the next (Comfort, 1985.) Clarifying functions
within disciplines and within time phases allows managers to see
more directly the relationships between immediate problems and
the resources available for solution, thereby increasing ef-
ficiency in disaster operations.
Cumulatively, these three problems interdependency,
organization and efficiency interact to diminish human
problem-solving capacity in disaster environments. Repeatedly,
we observe that human judgment falters in complex environments,
20
and performance drops (Simon, 1969, 1981; Comfort, 1985, 1986,
1987, 1988). This drop in performance is related directly to the
"load" (Deutsch, 1963, 1966; Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972), or
burden of demands, placed upon human cognitive capacity. It
results not from perverse intent or timidity, but from our
limited ability to process information in short-term memory
(Newell and Simon, 1972.)" According to cognitive theorists
Newell and Simon, human decision-makers solve immediate problems
using short-term memory capacity, but since this capacity is
limited to remembering only seven items at a time, plus or minus
two, it is easily overwhelmed in complex environments (Newell and
Simon, 1972; Simon, 1969, 1981). In disaster environments, with
the tremendous flux of information, the cognitive processes of
human decision-makers quickly become overloaded. Unable to
process the information quickly or accurately, human" decision-
makers ignore much of it ... and err in judgment, or worse, are
unable to act. Repeatedly observed in disaster environments
20
(Comfort, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989), this situation was ack-
nowledged by Soviet officials in Armenia, and prompted a sobering
re-examination of the disaster management process within the USSR
and among other national agencies involved in disaster assistance
and response. 20
Interview, Chief, Civil Defense, Armenia SSR, Yerevan,
Armenia, March 21, 1989. Other organizations, national and
international, also re-examined their roles 1n the Armenian
disaster operations in an effort to prepare more effectively for
participation in future disasters. For example, an international
conference of leaders of search and rescue teams was sponsored by
the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in Washington, D.C.,
21
The interaction of the conditions of disaster environments
and characteristics of human problem solving capacity creates a
condition in which the most promising alternative for ameliora-
tion lies in increasing individual and organizational capacity
for performance (Deutsch, 1963, 1966; Argyris, 1984, 1985). This
task, difficult by any measure, is conceivable with the ap-
propriate linkage of current information technology to individual
and organizational decision-making processes in disaster manage-
ment (Comfort, 1988, 1989.)
problem of design.
It is, however, quintessentially a
Increasing capacity for Problem-Solving in Uncertain Environments
The capacity of individuals, organizations and jurisdictions
to respond appropriately to the complex range of demands gener-
ated by a catastrophic earthquake depends directly upon access to
timely, accurate information and modes of processing information
relevant to action. In the complex, uncertain, dynamic environ-
ments of disaster, decision-makers are limited not only by the
technical failures of communications facilities, but also by
their own cognitive capacity, as stated above (Newell and Simon,
.1972; Simon, 1969, 1981). Barry Turner, British sociologist,
views the occurrence of disaster as a manifestation of gaps in
information in societal decision-making processes, and our conse-
quent ability to respond rationally to unanticipated problems
from the environment. Turner (1978:134) writes:
May 8-9, 1989 to explore means of improving performance in search
and rescue operations in future disasters.
22
... The limits on rationality are essentially the limits of
information-gathering in a world where information-gathering
has costs; the limits of the number of possible alternative
solutions which can reasonably be considered and evaluated
... and the limits of a lack of knOWledge of future events
where rational behavior depends upon the formulation and
successful execution of plans which promise attainments in
the future.
Consequently, the occurrence of disaster signals the need
for re-examination of the information processes upon which
decisions within and between organizations, wi thin and between
jurisdictions are based in environments. within the complex,
dynamic net of organizational interaction characterizing a given
community, particularly one vulnerable to seismic risk, gaps in
information, reasoning or communication may have triggered
unintended consequences, initiating a sequence of events that
lead to disaster. The decisions leading to the construction
(since 1979) of high-rise apartment building~ in Leninakan that
failed seriously in the December, 1988 earthquakes tragically
illustrate such gaps in information in the social decision-making
process. 21
Returning to Deutsch's (1963, 1966) concept of perceptive
reason, the most promising alternative for increasing human
rationality in the complex environment of disaster is to open
existing decision processes to insights, modes. of information
processing and assistance external to present actors and proce-
dures. Current information technology· allows us to extend our
21. Briefing, US Reconnaissance Team, Earthquake Engineering
Research Institute/National Research Council on the Armenian
Earthquakes, San Francisco, CA, February 9, 1989: 4:00 - 7:00
p. m••
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human problem-solving capacity with the aid of carefully designed
computerized knowledge bases, heuristic reasoning processes and
spatial representation of complex information, accessible over
long distances through telecommunications and satellite linkages
(Nii, 1987; Hayes-Roth, Waterman and Lenat, 1983; Dodhiawala,
Jagannathan, Baum and Skillman, 1989; McCann, Taylor and Tuori,
1988; Comfort, 1986, 1989). Yet, these systems need to be
designed to support human decision processes in the complex,
dynamic environments of disaster (Comfort, 1988, 1989).
Integrating Information Processes to Support Problem Solving in
Environments at Risk
The three initial problems identified" in the Armenian
disaster operations interdependence, organization and ef-
ficiency suggest three basic dimensions that characterize
decision processes in disaster management at each jurisdictional
level. These dimensions are time, function and discipline, and
can be represented in a layered knowledge base, as shown in
Figure 1. Within each jurisdiction, these dimensions may be
further specified into sub-types that order information needed by
disaster managers with differing responsibilities. The dimension
of discipline, for example, addresses the problem of interdepen-
dence. If information critical to decisions involving the
differing perspectives of disaster management technical,
organizational, medical, political and cultural -- are organized
by discipline and are accessible to all managers operating at
each jurisdictional level, the result will be a shared knowledge
24
FIGURE 1 A Model of Multi-jurisdictional Response in Disaster Management
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base for interdisciplinary problem solving that would otherwise
not be available to any single manager. This specification of
dimensions is shown for a local jurisdiction in Figure 2.
The dimension of time is critical, not only as a measure of
efficiency in disaster management, but in the clear specification
of tasks that show the sequence of evolving phases in disaster
management. Tasks not performed in one phase are likely to carry
over and increase the load of organizational demands requiring
response in succeeding phases. The classic sequence of time
phases in disaster management (McLoughlin, 1985), shown in Figure
2, allows the specification of primary tasks during each phase
for disaster managers at the respective jurisdictional levels.
The dimension of function is central to the integration of
information from the differing organizational actors within each
jurisdiction and within the set of four jurisdictions. Also-shown
in Figure 2 are five basic functions performed by managers at
each jurisdictional level: notification of the event, assessment
of needs, mobilization of resources, performance of tasks,
evaluation of performance and redesign of new actions.
In further specification of tasks, the information essential for
each discipline may be specified by time and function in disaster
management. Figure 3 illustrates this specification for the
medical discipline by the sUbdisciplines of basic life support,
advanced life support and prolonged life support (Safar, 1976,
1986; Klain et al., 1989)
In summary, it is possible to design a knowledge base that
26
orders information by the dimensions of time, function and
discipline that are essential to decision-making in environments
at risk. Such a knowledge base would both increase access to
shared information for participating disaster managers and reduce
the complexity of information processing required of managers in
disaster operations, thereby sUbstantively extending their
problem-solving capacity. Combined with the interactive capacity
of satellite and telecommunications facilities and intelligent
reasoning routines in the utilization of the knowledge base, it
is possible to create an interactive network of information
search, processing and dissemination for disaster management that
may increase performance in the difficult, complex, dynamic
environments of disaster (McCann, Taylor and Tuori, 1988.) A
demonstration model for an interactive, intelligent, spatial
information system· (IISIS) for local public, private and non-
profit organizations is currently under development for the
Pittsburgh Metropolitan Region (Comfort, Woods & Nesbitt, 1989.)
Critical to improving performance in disaster environments
is the accurate interpretation and appropriate utilization of the
information available to mUltiple decision-makers operating at
multiple levels in disaster management. Computers can also help
human decision makers shift levels of analysis more easily in
interpreting the vast flux of information that characterizes
disaster environments. The problem-solving process in disaster
management shifts through at least six levels of aggregation
and inference (Argyris, 1980:147) in the translation of informa-
29
tion into action, as shown in Figure 4. These shifts in levels
of aggregation and inference are not easy for managers with
emergency responsibilities, as each shift requires that we
rethink the problems in the context of expanded data and broader
categories of possible interaction (Argyris, 1984.) Under the
urgent stress and pressure of time in actual disaster operations,
this cognitive task is particularly difficult, if not impossible
for human decision-makers.
Most managers shift easily from the individual to the sub-
disciplinary to the disciplinary levels, but find it increasingly
difficult to move to mUltidisciplinary, interdisciplinary and
societal levels of aggregation of information and inference to
action. Yet, it is precisely the capacity to design actions at
these higher levels of aggregation and inference that are central
to increasing the effectiveness of performance of our organiza-
tional and social infrastructure in catastrophic disaster.
To respond effectively to disaster, or to cope with the
risks presented by environments vulnerable to disaster, we need
to create flexible organizations (Meltsner and Bellavita, 1984)
that will expand rapidly to meet the sudden demands of disaster
and contract easily when the threat has passed and operations
return to routine conditions. Current information technology
allows us to develop this capacity by design, and recent develop-
ments in disaster management are moving steadily in this direc-
tion. Figure 5 shows a set of existing information systems that
may serve this need, if extended and linked in a network of
30
FIGURE 4 Levels of Aggregation and Inference in Disaster Research
Level of Inference Unit of Aggregation Research Task
6 Societal Definition of Goal: To Protect Life and Reduce Loss
!
5 Interdisciplinary Definition of Problem
!
4 Multidisciplinary Data Collection and Measurement
! -
3 Disciplinary Data Analysis and Interpretation of Findings
!
2 Sub-disciplinary Design of Alternative Strategies for Action
!
1 Individual Direct Observation, Reflection and Redesign
Unit of Observation: Individual
Unit of Analysis: Organization
Measure of Performance: Efficiency in TIme
Outcome Variable: Lives Saved I Lives Lost
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FIGURE 5 Interactive International Disaster Information Network
United Nations Emergency Information Network
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international information systems to support decision processes
for disaster response and risk reduction.
Developed and used effectively, such a set of information
networks may be used to support "policy organizations," that is,
full time organizations of personnel with part-time responsi-
bilities (Meltsner and Bellavita, 1984) for disaster management.
Most managers with emergency responsibilities in pUblic and/or
private organizations have other responsibilities and other jobs.
They corne together only in the context of disaster to carry out a
common policy of coordinated response. These policy organiza-
tions could operate at jurisdictional levels to meet particular
demands or, linked together, respond promptly and appropriately
to meet the demands of a catastrophic disaster. Communication
and coordination processes are crucial, however, for the effec-
tive utilization of skills and knowledge of the respective parti-
cipants. To the extent that these organizations are designed and
used effectively, they are I ikely to reduce the dimensions of
catastrophe in environments at risk. Such utilization may be
facilitated through an interactive, intelligent, spatial informa-
tion system.
33
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